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ABSTRACT 
The central question addressed in this dissertation is whether one must have some degree of motivation 
to comply with their moral evaluation in order to count as genuinely making a sincere moral judgment. 
Those that view motivation as intrinsic to moral judgment (internalists) grant this condition on moral 
evaluation, while those that take motivation to be extrinsic to such judgments (externalists) deny this 
condition. The traditional dispute between internalists and externalists has centered around thought 
experiments devised to test the coherence of scenarios involving an agent that genuinely makes moral 
judgments while being entirely unmotivated by them–an individual called the amoralist. Recently, 
experimental methods have been employed to determine whether non-philosophers find amoralist 
scenarios coherent. This dissertation is concerned primarily with addressing two open questions 
regarding this recent experimental research: (1) what is this research really tracking in terms of folk 
psychology, and (2) what impact does this research have on the traditional philosophical dispute over 
moral internalism. I address (1) by presenting new research showing that amoralist scenarios seem 
more coherent in factive contexts (e.g., understands that X is wrong) but less coherent in non-factive 
contexts (e.g., believes that X is wrong). I call this the Factivity Effect, and I argue (via experiments) 
that it is likely a feature of our cognitive architecture concerning morality. I address (2) by arguing that 
empirical investigation of our shared concepts impacts metaethical questions–particularly the 
traditional dispute over moral internalism–in a way that is arguably unique to this branch of analytic 
philosophy. In short, moral psychology is vital for metaethics. 
